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I.

The balancing of the rights of the accused against the rights of a
witness in regard to anonymous testimony.

A. Issue
This memorandum examines how The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY), used judicial discretion to interpret variations in international law,
Statutes, Articles, and The Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Tribunals, as well as,
common law rulings, to attempt to create a balance between the fundamental due process
rights of an accused and the rights of protection due a testifying witness as pertains to
anonymity. 1
The landmark decision of the ICTY in Prosecutor v. Tadic,2 established a five-prong
balancing test to determine under which extreme circumstances can anonymous
testimony be permitted into evidence. Opposition to the majority decision in Tadic state,
that in making this discretionary ruling and setting out the five-prong test, The Tribunal
runs the risk of damaging the ICTY’s integrity in bypassing what many view as the
fundamental guarantees of a defendant to face and cross-examine his accusers.
Supporters of the decision, on the other hand, applaud a realistic approach to witness
protection, particularly when there is a real fear of reprisals from the accused due to the
nature of the crimes committed and because there is not an adequate witness protection
program in existence beyond the walls of The Hague and Arusha.
1

Issue: Witness protection and disclosure including case law on disclosure of nonredacted witness
statements. In e-mailing communications with Andra Mobberley she suggested parameters of issue to
include: total witness anonymity, since it was considered and applied at the Hague, and countries that
include statutory provisions in their evidence statutes (such as New Zealand), additionally analysis of
practices across jurisdictions.
2

Decision on the Prosecutors Motion requesting Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses,
Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic (para. 70) (August 10, 1995). (Herein Tadic Decision)
http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/trialc2/decision-e/100895pm.htm [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at
TAB 22]

1

This memorandum will evaluate critiques of the ICTY’s Tadic decision, by opponents
and proponents, in regard to permitting anonymous testimony and concerns of the
Tribunals ability to protect testifying witnesses as balanced against the fundamental
rights of the accused. The Tadic Trial Chamber majority granted total anonymity to the
witnesses, not only from the media but also from the defendant and his council, and
relied heavily on two international cases, Jarvie v. Magistrates from the Supreme Court
of Victoria Australia, and Kostovski v. Netherlands from The European Court of Human
Rights. 3 The Court in Jarvie permitted an undercover officer to testify under his known
pseudonym while his true identity was never revealed to the defendant at trial,4 the Court
in justifying its decision to balance of witness protection against the rights of the accused,
claimed the frailties inherent in a human system of justice.5
The balancing process accepts that justice, even criminal justice,
is not perfect, or even as perfect as human rules can make it…
A fair trial according to law does not mean a perfect trial,
free from possible detriment or disadvantage of any kind or
degree to the accused.6

Many jurisdictions have wrestled with the contradictions between the rights of the
accused to receive a “fair trial” as balanced against the protection of the witness.
3

Jarvie v. Magistrates’ Court of Victoria at Brunswick, Supreme Court of Victoria App. Div. 1 VR 84
(1994). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 15] and Kostovski v. The Netherlands (App.
No. 11454/85), Eur. Ct. H.R. (1990) 12 EHRR 434, ECHR 11454/85. 20 November 1989. [Reproduced in
the accompanying notebook at TAB 16]
4

Id. at 7-9, where the police commissioner testified to the dangers of identifying an under cover operative.
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 15]
5

Id. at 7-9. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 15]

6

Tadic Decision at (para. 72) Citing Jarvie v. Magistrates’ Court of Victoria at Brunswick, Supreme Court
of Victoria, App. Div. 1 VR 84 (1994). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 22] and
[TAB15 ]

2

However the majority of judicial decisions reflect the belief that the right to face ones
accuser to protect the rights of the accused from any bias or false testimony is
fundamental to a fair trial.
It is important that with the ongoing global concerns, such as terrorism or ethnic
tensions, that the International Tribunals, the ICTY or the ICTR or the Permanent
Criminal Court “establish itself as the preeminent defender of human rights and
particularly the right of every accused to a fair trial according to the most exacting
standards of due process required by contemporary international law.”7 It is imperative
that the Tribunal be looked to as a mechanism to allow for international justice and
accountability. Therefore, the Tribunals of the present and future, in light of these lofty
goals, must never be seen as using “unfettered discretion” but only the impartial voice of
justice.

B. Summary of Conclusions
1. Credibility of the Court
The integrity of the Tribunal will suffer if it is perceived to operate with
“unfettered discretion” in its interpretation of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
Justices interpreting the same Rules and Statutes in the Tadic decision arrived at
opposing positions in relation to permitting anonymous testimony to protect witnesses, at
the expense of the accused to: (1) face his accusers and; (2) to examine and crossexamine the witness. Justice McDonald’s propositions that the ICTY qualifies to operate
within its own context and need not be bound by previous rulings of other judicial
7

Monroe Leigh, The Yugoslav Tribunal: Use of Unnamed Witnesses Against Accused. 90 A.J.I.L. 325
(1996). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 43]

3

bodies,8 contradicts with Justice Stephens’ assertion that minimum guarantees offered to
an accused cannot be diminished in favor of victims and witnesses. It is essential that the
Tribunals now in place, and to come, represent a credible front to the international
community,9 and that the rights of the parties brought before it are not sacrificed through
the manipulation of ambiguous language in the Statues and Rules.

2. The Balance
The ICTY and ICTR, as well as the future Permanent International Court, face a
circular dilemma. To either protect witnesses to the detriment of the accused, or to find
willing eyewitnesses to testify under the risk of retribution or reprisals. The options are to
initiate a functioning, financed witness protection program that encompasses the needs of
the victims who must relive the horrors they have already endured to aid the Tribunal in
holding criminals accountable. If this can be introduced then the issue of anonymous
testimony will be moot. However if options such as In Camera proceedings, video
testimony, screens, immunity for testimony, or plea-bargaining, fail, then the use of the
balancing test introduced in Tadic may be required in the interim. A critique of the Tadic
balancing proposition pointed out that if the Tribunal must resort to balancing the rights
of the accused against the safety of witnesses, it suggests that the minimum rights of the

8

Natasha A. Affolder, Tadic: The Anonymous Witness and the Sources of International Procedural Law.
19 Mich. J. Int’l L. 445 (1998). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 37]
9

Monroe Leigh, Witness Anonymity is Inconsistent with Due Process. 91 A.J.I.L. 80, 83 (1997). The
author recognizes the need to find a more “nuanced way of handling of sensitive cases, still thinks that
during this period of time of the necessity to build up the Tribunals credibility, it cannot be criticized for its
due process rulings. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 44]

4

accused to a fair trial shows that these rights can be sacrificed on behalf of witness
safety.10
Additionally, if anonymous testimony is to be permitted it should be drafted or
amended into the Rules of Procedure and Evidence and not be addressed in the Trial
Chamber for interpretation or “unfettered discretion.”

3. Case Law Across Jurisdictions
The Courts of England and Wales will usually compel a witness to testify, and
only in certain circumstances allow written statements in place of oral testimony; such as
(1) death, (2) unfit to attend trial, (3) outside of the country, and (4) the statement was
made to an investigating officer. 11 The one unreported English case that permitted total
anonymity of the witness resulted in a press blackout and an acquittal for the
defendant.12 The English Courts prefer to resort to In Camera proceedings in the
situation of witness intimidation.
The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) evaluates all cases before it to
ensure the proceedings are fair. The ECHR will enter into evidence statements made by
anonymous witnesses but not as sole evidence resulting in conviction of the accused, only

10

Michael P. Scharf, Trial and Error: An assessment of the First Judgment of the Yugoslavia War Crimes
Tribunal, 30 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 167 (1997-98). Citing Monroe Leigh.
Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 179]

11

Annemarieke Beijer, Cathy Cobley, and André Klip, Witness Evidence, Article 6 of the European
Convention on Human Rights and the Principal of Open Justice 283 in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN EUROPE: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY (Phil Fennell, Christopher Harding, Nico JÖrg, Bert Swart eds., 1995). [Reproduced
in the accompanying notebook at TAB 49]
12

Id. at 291. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 49]

5

as corroborative evidence.13 For otherwise the limitations placed on a defendant would
be irreconcilable with the guarantees found in Article 6. 14
Similarly in the Netherlands, the Dutch Association of Judges were concerned
with witnesses refusing to testify unless granted anonymity.15 Legislation was proposed
by the “Commission on Threatened Witnesses,” however with the ECHR’s decision in
Kostovski, where the Netherlands were found to have violated the rights of the accused
legislation may not be forthcoming.16 The Dutch criminal process has no rule against
hearsay evidence, and allows in all material evidence gathered at the investigative stage
including witness statements which can be presented at trial.
New Zealand on the other hand, based on R. v. Hughes, will not allow at trial
anonymous testimony even in the situation involving an undercover police officer. The
New Zealand court has upheld the accuseds' rights as absolute and any changes to the
common law position should be handled by Parliament. 17
The United States has federal Constitutional guarantee in the Sixth Amendment
which allows for the confrontation of the accused with the accuser. A recent California
Supreme Court case, Alvardo v. Superior Court of Los Angeles attempted to challenge the
ability to enter anonymous testimony at trial, but while the California Court would allow

13

Kostovski v. The Netherlands (App. No. 11454/85), Eur. Ct. H.R. (1990) 12 EHRR 434, ECHR
11454/85. 20 November 1989. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 16]

14

Annemarieke Beijer at 288. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 49]

15

Kostovski v. The Netherlands at (para.34) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 16]

16

Id. at (para. 34). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 16]

17

R v. Hughes, [1986] 2 N.Z.L.R. 129. (C. A. New Zealand). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook
at TAB 25]

6

protections during the pre-trial phase, the confrontation clause trumps the witnesses’
safety. 18
Of these jurisdictions, no cases were found to permit total witness anonymity as
being the sole basis for a conviction. Several jurisdictions allow anonymous testimony to
corroborate other evidence presented at Trial. Anonymity of witnesses is often permitted
during pre-trial preparation to protect a witness’s identity, however at trial, to protect the
rights of the accused, the right to examine and cross-examine prevails.

II.

Formation and Interpretation of the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence
A. Formation

Under Article 14 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR), the Tribunal is governed by the Rules of Procedure and Evidence originally
created for the International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia with some
revision.19 While the ICTY judges chose to use an adversarial approach to the Court’s
Rules of Procedure, as opposed to an inquisitorial process, this was not always the case

18

Alvarado v. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County. 5 P.3d 203 (Cal. 2000). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at TAB 11]

19

Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda: S/RES/955 (1994) (Annex), 8 November 1994,
reprinted in VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR
RWANDA, VOL. 2(1998). Article 14: Rules of Procedure and evidence; provides: The judges of the
International Tribunal for Rwanda shall adopt, for the purpose of proceedings before the International
Tribunal for Rwanda, the rules of procedure and evidence for the conduct of the pre-trial phase of the
proceedings, trials and appeals, the admission of evidence, the protection of victims and witnesses and
other appropriate matters of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia with such changes as they
deem necessary. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 9]

7

with respect to the international courts.20 Three issues in particular differentiate The
ICTY from an adversarial system; (1) the admittance of hearsay evidence; (2) The
Tribunal can order the parties to produce additional evidence if necessary, and; (3) The
Tribunal does not permit plea-bargaining or immunity.21 Other discrepancies, which
have caused discord in the international community, include the judicial interpretation
and the discretionary power permitted within the framework of the rules of evidence.
This issue is relevant in relation to the decision in Prosecutor v. Tadic, where Justice
Stephens’ separate opinion from the majority decision brings into question the
interpretation of the ICTY statute and rules and the balancing process in regard to
anonymous testimony. What hangs in the balance is the court’s integrity, the security of
witnesses or victims and the fundamental guarantees allowed the accused. Opponents of
the practice of allowing anonymous witnesses believe that the Tribunal must amend the
rules so that anonymity for witnesses and victims is not an option.22 While proponents

20

MICHAEL P. SCHARF, BALKAN JUSTICE: THE STORY BEHIND THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES
TRIAL SINCE NUREMBERG, 67 (1997). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 52]
21

Id. at 67. In particular, the determination that the Tribunal would not permit immunity, created a great
deal of disagreement. The United States wished to include a provision permitting limited immunity in
exchange for testimony to prosecute military or political leaders who ordered said atrocities. “The
President of the Tribunal, Antonio Casse responded: The persons appearing before us will be charged with
genocide, torture, murder, sexual assault, wanton destruction, persecution and other inhuman acts. After
due reflection, we have decided that no one should be immune from prosecution for crimes such as these,
no matter how useful their testimony may otherwise be.” [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
TAB 52]

22

Vincent M. Creta, The Search for Justice in the Former Yugoslavia and Beyond: Analyzing the Rights of
the Accused Under The Rules of Procedure and Evidence of The International Criminal Tribunal For the
Former Yugoslavia. 20 Hous. J. Int’l 381,401 (1998). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB
40]

8

argue that narrowly construing the right of examination by the defendant is prudent in the
Tribunal’s desire to protect the victims who participate in the trial.23
B. Interpretation: Judicial Discretion
Detractors of recent rulings, protest that the ambiguous language of the Rules,
leaves the judges of the trial chamber “unfettered discretion to direct virtually any
protective measure, for any reason.”24 These concerns in relation to judicial discretion
may negatively impact the integrity of the court.25 Judge McDonald of the ITCY, before
the prepatory commission for the ICC reflected her belief in the necessity for judicial
discretion and latitude in interpreting the Rules of Procedure, where she stated:
Now that the Statute is in place, you are turning to the equally important task
of drafting the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. Rules are important to the
Court because they establish the framework for conducting trial and appellate
proceedings….That is what the Rules should be- a framework, not a straitjacket…
For the judges to effectively manage and direct the proceedings, the Rules must
be sufficiently flexible to allow them to exercise discretion when necessary.26
23

Alex C. Lakotos, Note: Evaluating the Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the International Tribunal in
the Former Yugoslavia: Balancing Witnesses’ Needs Against Defendant’s Rights. 46 Hastings L.J. 909,
933 (1995). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 42]

24

Mercedeh Momeni, Balancing the Procedural Rights of the Accused Against a Mandate to Protect
Victims and Witnesses: An Examination of the Anonymity Rules of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia. 41 How. L.J. 155, 164 (1997). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
TAB 45]
25

Id. at 164. Where Professor Falvey voiced that this “unfettered discretion” may damage the integrity of
the court, particularly in relation to anonymous testimony. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
TAB 45]
26

Press Release. REMARKS MADE BY JUDGE GABRIELLE KIRK MCDONALD, PRESIDENT OF THE
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, TO THE PREPATORY COMMISSION FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT. THE HAGUE, 30 July 1999. JL/P.I.S./425-E.
http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p425-e.htm. Full Quote: “Now that the Statute is in place, you are
turning to the equally important task of drafting the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. Rules are important
to the Court because they establish the framework for conducting trial and appellate proceedings. They
provide guidance to the parties as to what they can expect in those proceedings and bring consistency to the
Court’s decisions and work. While the Rules serve several important functions, we must bear in mind that
they can only be a framework; the Rules cannot, no matter how well crafted, foresee every courtroom
situation. That is what the Rules should be- a framework, not a straitjacket… For the judges to effectively

9

The international community has an interest in the fair administration of justice
and in seeking vindication for war crimes committed, and in seeing those who violate
international humanitarian law brought to trial. 27 In balancing these objectives The
Tribunal must be seen as upholding internationally accepted norms within its proceedings
in order to establish the veracity of the forum, and therefore procedures must comply
with standard human rights guarantees. 28
If the judges of the Tribunal are perceived as arrogant and fully justified in
utilizing “unfettered discretion,” whereby the integrity of the court is damaged, then the
overall purpose of the Tribunal in bringing war criminals to justice in a neutral and fair
forum will suffer irreparable harm. Additionally, if decisions by the tribunal are
consistently at odds with existing international case law and precedent concerning rights
of the defense, then the Tribunal will lack the strength in the international community to
hold these defendants accountable for the atrocities that have brought them before the
court. The ICTY, in the decision of Tadic, was very cautious in analyzing and
interpreting the Tribunal’s Statute and Rules, as well as the European Court of Human
Right’s rulings and other case precedence before deciding to initiate the five-prong test.

manage and direct the proceedings, the Rules must be sufficiently flexible to allow them to exercise
discretion when necessary.” [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 53].
27

Christine Chinkin, International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Amicus Curae Brief on Protective
Measures for Victims and Witnesses, 7 Crim. L.F. 179, 183 (1996). [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at TAB 38]

28

Id. at 182. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 38]
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C. The Relevant Articles and Rules
The ICTY incorporated the standards of domestic law and case law of the
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), and recognized that these standards must be
used in the context of the unique issues before the Tribunal, with special emphasis on the
Tribunal’s mandate to protect victims and witnesses.29 The Tribunal must balance and
interpret numerous ICTY articles and Rules of Procedure to preserve the rights of the
accused, to protect testifying witnesses and the public, so that defendants receive a fair
trial and appropriate justice.
The relevant Articles are 20(1) conduct at trial with due regard for witness
protection,30 Article 21(2) entitlement of the accused to a fair trial,31 Article 21(4)(e), the
rights of the accused,32 and Article 22 protection of the witnesses.33 Under the ICTY

29

Tadic Decision (para. 70) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 22]

30

Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.
http://www.un.org/itcy/basic/staut/stat2000.htm [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 8]
Article 20 (1) Commencement and conduct to trial proceedings, states:
The Trial Chambers shall ensure that a trial is fair and expeditious
and that the proceedings are conducted in accordance with the rules
of procedure and evidence, with full respect for the rights of the accused
and due regard for the protection of victims and witnesses.

31

Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.
http://www.un.org/itcy/basic/staut/stat2000.htm [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 8]
Article 21(2) Rights of the accused, states:
In the determination of the charges against him, the accused shall
Be entitled to a fair and public hearing subject to article 22 of the Statute.

32

Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.
http://www.un.org/itcy/basic/staut/stat2000.htm [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 8]
Article 21(4)(e) Rights of the accused, states:
In the determination of any charge against the accused pursuant
to the present Statute, the accused shall be entitled to the following
minimum guarantees, in full equality: (e) to examine, or have examined,
the witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and
examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions
as the witnesses against him;

11

Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the pertinent rules are: Rules 69,34 75(A), 75(B)(iii)
the anonymity of witnesses in the pre-trial and trial stages is addressed. 35
While these rules and articles lay out the rights of the parties and the protection of
witnesses, there exists sufficient room for interpretation. The Trial Chamber in Tadic
was dependent on testimony to hold the defendant accountable, and without the ability to

33

Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.
http://www.un.org/itcy/basic/staut/stat2000.htm [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 8]
Article 22 Protection of victims and witnesses, states:
The International Tribunal shall provide in its rule of procedure
and evidence for the protection of victims and witnesses. Such
protective measures shall include, but shall not be limited to, the
conduct of in camera proceedings and the protection of the victim’s
identity.

34

Rules Of Procedure and Evidence: The International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Selected rules.
http://www.un.org/icty/basic/rpe/IT32_rev21.htm [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 7 ]
Rule 69 Protection of Victims and Witnesses, states:
(A) In exceptional circumstances, the Prosecutor may apply to a Trial
Chamber to order the non-disclosure of the identity of a victim or
witness who may be in danger or at risk until such person is brought
under the protection of the Tribunal.
(B) In the determination of protective measures for victims and witnesses,
the Trial Chamber may consult the Victims and Witnesses Section.
(C) Subject to Rule 75, the identity of the victim or witness shall be disclosed in sufficient time
prior to trial to allow adequate time for preparation of the defense.34
35

Rules Of Procedure and Evidence: The International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Selected rules.
http://www.un.org/icty/basic/rpe/IT32_rev21.htm [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 7]
Rule 75 Measures for the Protection of Victims and Witnesses, states:
(A) A Judge or a Chamber may, proprio motu or at the request of either party, or
the victim or witness concerned, or of the Victims and Witnesses Section, order appropriate
measures for the privacy and protection of victims and witnesses, provided that the measures
are consistent with the rights of the accused;
(B) A Chamber may hold an in camera proceeding to determine whether to order:
(i) measures to prevent disclosure to the public or the media of the identity or
whereabouts of a victim or witness, or of persons related to or associated with a
victim or witness by such means as:
(a) expunging names and identifying information from the Tribunals public
records;
(b) non-disclosure to the public of any records identifying the victim;
(c) giving of testimony through image-or voice-altering devices or closed
circuit television; and
(d) assignment of a pseudonym;
(ii)closed sessions, in accordance with Rule 79;
(iii) appropriate measures to facilitate the testimony of vulnerable victims
35
and witnesses, such as one-way closed circuit television.

12

adequately protect witnesses before the court, chose to initiate a balancing mechanism to
allow anonymous testimony into evidence.
In contrast, the Rwanda Tribunal has required the Prosecutor to disclose the identity
of victims and witnesses to the defense, before the trial commences, to allow for adequate
cross-examination.36 Additionally, the Trial Chamber of the Rwanda Tribunal has
determined that a prosecutor, even in the pretrial phase, cannot withhold the identity of
testifying witnesses from the defense without an order from the Trial Chamber.37
The danger to witnesses in Rwanda is even greater as Hutu militias continue to
forcibly induct young men into their units while threatening to seize power.38 U.N.
observers have also estimated that between May and June of 1996 ninety-nine witnesses
to the Rwandan genocide have been murdered by Hutu extremists.39
In Prosecutor v. Akayesu, measures were implemented to provide partial anonymity
to protect the identity of witnesses for both the defense and prosecution.40 Alphabetical
pseudonyms were created to identify each witness, and no information was provided

36

1 VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA,
540 (1998). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 51]

37

Id. at 541. Where the prosecution is required to disclose the identity of witnesses and victims, and their
non-redacted statements, to the defense at least fifteen to thirty days before the trial commences. See note
1806 at 541. (citing several motions and decisions by the Rwanda Tribunal). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at TAB 51]

38

PAUL J. MAGNARELLA, JUSTICE IN AFRICA: RWANDA’S GENOCIDE ITS COURTS, AND THE UN CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL, (2000), 74. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 50]
39

Id. at 74. Since eyewitness testimony is paramount, the loss of so many witnesses will be a detriment to
the prosecutor’s case. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 51]

40

Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T. Decision of:2 September 1998, Judgment. (para. 18)
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Akayesu/judgement/akay001.htm
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which could identify those testifying.41 Additionally, screens kept the public from seeing
the testifying witness but the accused and his council was able to view the witness. On
defense witness was also heard in camera another successful method of protecting
testifying witnesses.42
Many initial motions were made by the defense and prosecution in regard to witness
testimony, the defense presented motions charging the prosecution with investigating the
veracity of a witness’s testimony.43 The Chamber dismissed the motion stating that the
defense’s doubts to witness reliability was not sufficient to establish the intentional
giving of false testimony.44 The defense in Akayesu also claimed the inherent dangers
and “fragility of human testimony,” particularly in regard to eyewitness testimony.45 The
defense also alleged that “syndicates of informers” collaborated to concoct testimony
against the accused.46
Akayesu was found guilty on 15 counts based in part on partial anonymity of the
eyewitnesses.47

[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 20]
41

Id. at (para. 20). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 20]

42

Id. at (para. 20). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 20]

43

Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T. Decision of:9 March 1998. Decision on the Defense
Motions to Direct the Prosecutor to Investigate the Matter for False Testimony by Witness “R”.
http://www.itcr.org/English/cases/Akayesu/decisions/FALSR090398.html
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 18]

44

Id. at (para 20). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 20]

45

Id. at (para 33). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 20]

46

Id. at (para. 33). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 20]

47

PAUL J. MAGNARELLA, JUSTICE IN AFRICA: RWANDA’S GENOCIDE ITS COURTS, AND THE UN CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL, 109 (2000). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 50]
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III.

ICTY Five-Prong Test Permitting Anonymous Testimony Into
Evidence
The Trial Chamber of the ICTY laid out its criteria for the determination of

circumstances that would warrant the introduction of anonymous testimony in the Tadic
Decision, the Prosecutor’s Motion requesting Protective Measures for Victims and
Witnesses. This five-prong test is as follows:
1) There must exist a real fear for the witnesses’ safety or that of their family,
and real grounds for fear of retribution if the witnesses identity is released.48
2) The witnesses testimony must be relevant and of such import that it would
hinder the Prosecutor’s case to proceed without it.49
3) The Trial Chamber must be satisfied that there exists no prima facie evidence
that the witness is untrustworthy. The prosecutor is required to examine the
background of the witness and be assured of no criminality and that the
witness is impartial.50
4) The Trial Chamber’s inability to provide adequate protection for witnesses
has considerable weight when evaluating whether to grant anonymity.51

48

Tadic Decision (para. 62) In addition others can express the fears for the safety of the witness if the
identity is revealed as in other family members, the Victims and Witness Unit or the Prosecutor.
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 22]

49

Id. at (para. 63) Since the Tribunal is particularly dependent on eyewitness testimony it often becomes
critical to find the willingness of witnesses to testify. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB
22]

50

Id. at (para. 64). The prosecutor would disclose to the defense any report in relation to the credibility of
the witness within the parameters of the anonymity sought. This is a protective mechanism to assure the
witness does not posses an extensive criminal background and is acting in retaliation against the accused,
for granting anonymity under these circumstances would seriously prejudice the case of the defense.
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 22]

51

Id. at (para. 65). The witness protection program is virtually non-existent only applying to the basic
surroundings of The Hague. In addition many of the witnesses families still live within the territory of the
Former Yugoslavia, as in any Tribunal the realities of retribution are that loved ones may be persecuted in
retaliation or as an example to others because of the testimony of an identified witness. [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at TAB 22]
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5) If at all possible, the Tribunal must determine if less restrictive measures can
be utilized to secure the necessary protection on behalf of the witness. For
this to be satisfied the accused must suffer no additional avoidable prejudice
in light of granting anonymity.52

Judge McDonald of the majority questions whether the Trial Chamber should be
bound by rulings of other judicial bodies or whether the Trial Chamber should adapt
those rulings to its own context.53 When faced with the case law of international judicial
bodies interpretation on what constitutes the minimum standards for the accused in a fair
trial, Judge McDonald stressed the importance of the Tribunals “unique requirements.”54
She also differentiates the Tribunal from a strictly adversarial model, and interprets the
ECHR as fundamentally applicable only to ordinary criminal and civil adjudication.55
Judge McDonald also stresses the affirmative obligation to protect its witnesses, for
without an adequate police force and in light of ongoing conflicts, the exceptional
circumstances permits derogation from international standards in regard to the admission
of anonymous testimony and that this approach does not violate the right of examination
or a fair trial for the accused.56 Judge McDonald states that the Tribunal, under Rule

52

Id. at (para. 66). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 22]

53

Natasha A. Affolder, Tadic, The Anonymous Witness and the Sources of International Procedural Law.
19 Mich. J. Int’l L. 445, 455 (1998). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 37]
54

Id. at 455. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 37]

55

Id. at 456. where Judge McDonald affirms that the “International Tribunal must interpret its provisions
within its own context.” Which is differentiated by its affirmative obligation to protect witnesses.
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 37]

56

Id. at 456. Judge McDonald also addresses the derogation provisions in the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 3]
the European Convention on Human Rights, [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 2]
and the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
TAB 1] The McDonald judgment also refers to examples of municipal legislation permitting limits on
public disclosure, such as United Kingdom Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976, The Canadian
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75(A) and B(iii), sees anonymous testimony as a protective measure, and that Rule 69 as
specifically permitting anonymity in exceptional circumstances.57
Judge Stephens in his separate opinion, which dissents from the majority, states
that it is the responsibility of the Trial Chamber to “fully respect internationally
recognized standards regarding the rights of the accused.”58 His concerns stem from the
deviation from the standard guarantees of a “fair and public” trial found in Article 21,
because of the need to protect witnesses under Article 22, which deviates from the quality
of the hearing, and Article 22 was not designed to consider unfair hearings.59
The interpretations of the same sources of procedural law by both justices, and the
differentiation in the weight allotted to these same sources, were able to produce two
diametrically opposed positions on the use of anonymous testimony.60 Since the majority
has permitted the use of the five-prong test, analysis of each prong may bring clarity to
the difficulty in balancing the rights of the parties.

Criminal Code, The Evidence Act (Amendment) 1989) (Qeensland), the Criminal Procedure Act of South
Africa.
57

Natasha A. Affolder, at 458. Where 69(c) in conjunction with 75 extends the power of the Trial
chamber to grant anonymity during both pre-trial and trial stages. [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at TAB 37]
58

Id at 461. and additionally to endure that the trial is fair and expeditious and that the proceedings are
conducted within the rights of the accused and according to the Rules of Procedure. [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at TAB 37]

59

Id at 461. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 37]

60

Id at 464. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 37]
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A. There must exist a real fear for the witnesses’ safety or that of their
family, and real grounds for fear of retribution if the witnesses’ identity is
released.61
In Yugoslavia , the United Nations Commission of Experts had evidence of grave
violations of International Humanitarian Law, which had been conducted on a massive
scale inclusive of ethnic cleansing.62 The Chamber of the Tribunal had to recognize that
serious aspects of armed conflict include, the systematic spread of anguish and terror
amongst civilians.63 The International Community has a broad interest in the safety of
witnesses for the pursuit of justice “to put an end to such crimes and to take effective
measures to bring to justice the persons who are responsible for them.”64 For without
eyewitness accounts, these crimes may go unpunished.
The witness’s participation in the Tribunal’s proceedings should not create an
atmosphere of re-victimization whereby the witness, through testimony, must revisit the
trauma of the event, “before an indifferent bureaucracy, an assaultive defense team, or an
unsympathetic media.65 When evaluating the magnitude of the crimes in Yugoslavia, the
“parade of horrors’ include “ethnic cleansing”, executions, detention camps, torture,
starvation, sexual mutilation, mass rapes and forced pregnancies.66 In Rwanda, the

61

Tadic Decision (para. 62). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 22]

62

Christine Chinkin, Due Process and Witness Anonymity, 91 A.J.I.L. 75, 77 (1997). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at TAB 39]
63

Id. at 77. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 39]

64

Id. at 77 (1997). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 39]

65

Alex C. Lakotos, Note: Evaluating the Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the International Tribunal in
the Former Yugoslavia: Balancing Witnesses’ Needs Against Defendant’s Rights. 46 Hastings L.J. 909
(1995). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 42]

66

Id. at 914-916. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 42]
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slaughter of 500,000 to 1 million Tutsis by the Hutu’s, included mass killings where
hundreds of thousands were murdered and thrown into mass graves, gang rapes of Tutsi
women, and violent sexual mutilation.67 Other nation States are dealing with internal
conflict, to such proportions, that additional protections are necessary for the very judicial
system that is attempting to face the political and social ills which plague the nation.
The South American nation of Columbia has been forced to operate its judicial
system with “faceless Judges,” where the judges hold sessions in anonymity due to the
ongoing political assassinations.68 From 1988 to 1990, over 14,000 Columbians had been
killed for political reasons.69 Columbia was operating in a situation of “atrocities and
murderous retributions committed by all combatants.”70 While Columbia differs in that
the nation state is attempting to bring defendants to justice within their national
framework, the plight of Columbia and other nation states reflects the importance of a
neutral tribunal to bring human rights violators to account for their crimes.
The purpose of reiterating the extent of the atrocities committed within these
nations is to reiterate that the crimes being prosecuted are barbaric. In Yugoslavia,
67

1 VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 47,
55 (1998). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 51]
68

Luz Estella Nagle, Columbia’s Faceless Justice: A necessary Evil, Blind Impartiality or Modern
Inquisition? 61 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 881, 910 (2000). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 46]

69

Id. at 911 (2000). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 46]

70

Id. at 910-911. Where the carnage included the indiscriminate bombing of public places and outdoor
establishments, and police officers were targeted by the Cartel’s promises to pay for each murdered police
officer, and public figures such as journalists, judges where systematically kidnapped and murdered. “As a
former Columbian judge, I believe that anonymous justice was a viable remedy at a time to preserve the
lives of those dealing directly with crimes against the state, government corruption and organized criminal
enterprise. Drug traffickers, guerillas, paramilitary groups and corrupt elements in the government and
military killed too many judges, prosecutors, honest government officials, politicians and journalists. On
paper, being faceless seemed the only way to defend the judges still possessed of integrity and honesty to
fight for the rule of law at such a critical impasse in the nations history.” [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at TAB 46]
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during the reign of Tito, ethnic violence was not punished or addressed. 71 In attempting
to avenge past violence, a spiral or retribution and counter-retribution persisted. 72 This
would reflect a cultural perception of non-accountability and fear of reprisals. Rape
survivors, besides the trauma and stigma of the crime, must cope with the violation of
self, and in speaking out, may face retribution from their culture, family, husbands as
well as from the actual rapist.

73

The Trial Chamber acknowledges that it is reasonable to find a legitimate reaction
of fear on behalf of the witnesses testifying at trial. This initial prong of the Tadic test
should be easily met. 74 “It is generally sufficient for a court to find that the ruthless
character of an alleged crime justifies such fear of the accused and his accomplices.”75
With the extreme violence of the crimes, and the power which the accused once
wielded, fear of confronting such a defendant may be a paralyzing prospect for any
witness particularly with the knowledge of the horrific acts these individuals are capable
of committing.

71

Alex C. Lakotos, Note: Evaluating the Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the International Tribunal in
the Former Yugoslavia: Balancing Witnesses’ Needs Against Defendant’s Rights. 46 Hastings L.J. 909,
922 (1995). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 42]

72

Id. at 922 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 42]

73

Id. at 921. Particularly in Muslim society where women can be severely punished for infidelities
regardless of consent. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 42]

74

Mercedeh Momeni, Balancing the Procedural Rights of the Accused Against a Mandate to Protect
Victims and Witnesses: An Examination of the Anonymity Rules of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia. 41 How. L.J. 155, 172 (1997). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
TAB 45]
75

Id. at 172 citing to. Tadic Decision . [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 45]
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B. The witnesses testimony must be relevant and of such import that it would
hinder the Prosecutor’s case to proceed without it.76
Eyewitness testimony, unlike at Nuremberg, would be paramount to the ICTY
and ICTR prosecution’s case.77 However, the Trial Chamber must balance the interests of
both the witness and the accused and in exceptional circumstances will grant anonymity
to witnesses where human rights instruments allow for the deviation from standard
procedural guarantees.78 Justice McDonald stated that she viewed the role of the ITCY
more in line with a military tribunal, which allows for greater latitude in the admittance
of evidence, while more limiting in due process rights.79

76

Tadic Decision at (para. 63) . [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 22]

77

MICHAEL P. SCHARF, BALKAN JUSTICE: THE STORY BEHIND THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES
TRIAL SINCE NUREMBERG 117 (1997). In the Nuremberg Trials the Nazi’s kept their own through
documentation, which diminished the need for extensive eyewitness testimony. The prosecution at
Nuremberg submitted over 7 million documents. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 52]
78

Article 15 ECHR: Derogation in Time of Emergency 15(1) In time of War or other public emergency
threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its
obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided
that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law. [Reproduced in
the accompanying notebook at TAB 2]

Article 4 ICCPR: Article 4(1) In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the
existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present Covenant may take measures
derogating from their obligations under the present Covenant to the extent strictly required by the
exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations
under international law and do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex,
language, religion or social origin. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 3]
Article 27 of American Convention on Human Rights: Article 27. Suspension of Guarantees 27(1) In time
of war, public danger, or other emergency that threatens the independence or security of a State Party, it
may take measures derogating from its obligation under the present Convention to the extent and for the
period of time strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not
inconsistent with its other obligations under international law and do not involve discrimination on the
ground of race, color, sex, language, religion or social origin. (2) The foregoing provision does not
authorize any suspension of the following articles: Article 3 (Right to Juridical Personality), Article 4
(Right to Life), Article 5 (Right to Humane Treatment), Article 6 (Freedom from Slavery), Article 9
(Freedom from Ex Post Facto Laws), Article 12 (Freedom of Conscience and Religion), Article 17 (Rights
of the Family), Article 18 (Right to a Name), Article 19 (Rights of the Child), Article 20 (Right to
Nationality), and Article 23 (Right to Participate in Government), or the judicial guarantees essential for the
protection of such rights. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 1]
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In Judge Stephens’ separate decision/dissent in Tadic he states “the authorities
appear to me to provide strong support for the view that in this case to permit anonymity
of witnesses whose identity is of significance to the defendant will not only adversely
affect the appearance of justice being done, but is likely actually to interfere with the
doing of justice.”80 Additionally, the Dutch lawyer assigned by the Tribunal to defend
Tadic believed he could not adequately continue representation of the defendant if he,
and not the defendant, was made aware of the identities of the witnesses.81 Judge
Stephens stated that the decision in Jarvis v. Magistrates’ Court of Victoria was
substantially different since the issue there was testimony given under the witness’s real
names, as opposed to false names under which they appeared in court and gave
evidence.82 Justice Stephens also relies on the ruling before the European Court of
Human Rights, Kostovski v. The Netherlands,83 where anonymous witnesses made out of
court statements against Kostovski and co-accused parties, which were admitted into
evidence, resulting in a conviction and six years imprisonment. 84 Kostovski complained
of violations under Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights, claiming he
79

MICHAEL P. SCHARF, BALKAN JUSTICE: THE STORY BEHIND THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES
TRIAL SINCE NUREMBERG 109 (1997). Justice McDonald went on to show approval for the admittance of
hearsay evidence and ex parte affidavits during the Nuremberg trials, but this actually drew a great deal of
criticism about the acceptable standards of the court. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB
52]
80

Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, 13 (10 August 1995) Separate Opinion of Judge Stephen on the
Prosecutor’s Motion Requesting Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses. (Herein Tadic Dissent)
http://www.un.org/itcy/tadic/trialc2/decision-e/50810pmn.htm [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook
at TAB 23]
81

Id. at 13. (case pagination unavailable, page numbers refer to page numbers in accompanying document).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 23]

82

Id. at 12. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 23]

83

Kostovski v. The Netherlands (App. No. 11454/85), Eur. Ct. H.R. (1990) 12 EHRR 434, ECHR
11454/85. 20 November 1989. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 16]

84

Id. at (para. 11-16). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 16]
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was denied the right to a fair trial.85 While the Government of the Netherlands stressed
case-law, practice, and the need for anonymous testimony due to the increased
intimidation of witnesses while balancing society’s interests, the court concluded that the
constraints placed on Kostovski severely affected the rights of the defense and held that
the defendant did not receive a fair trial under Article 6(3)(d). Even though the ECHR
ruled that Kostovski was in violation of Article 6, the Trial Chamber in Tadic still used
its balancing test to justify the allowance of anonymous testimony setting itself apart
from international case precedence.
In Jarvis the Appeals Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria Australia, permitted
undercover police officers to give testimony at trial identified only by their
pseudonyms.86 The Australian Court presented examples of 15 United States’ cases
where the witness’s address or place of employment was withheld from a defendant
without infringing on the defendant’s constitutional rights, nor their right to effective

85

Id. at (para. 35). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 16]
Articles 6 (1) and 6(3)(d) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms which state:
Article 6(1) In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him,
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial
tribunal established by law…
Article 6(3)(d) Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:…
(d) to examine or to have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance of witnesses on his
behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him;… [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook
at TAB 2]

86

Jarvie v. Magistrates’ Court of Victoria at Brunswick, Supreme Court of Victoria, App. Div. 1 VR 84 ,
7-9 (1994). The Deputy Commissioner for the Police, through affidavit, testified that for under cover
operatives the danger of injury or death was a reality since the Witness protection program which had been
in operation for over 10 years was not entirely effective, and disclosure puts officers in the path of needing
to relocate or serious injury if their true identities are known. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook
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cross-examination. 87 The Jarvis Court goes on to state that through their examination of
multiple authorities on the issue, inclusive of United States’ rulings, the question of
withholding from the defendant information that would determine the identity of a State
or Government witness, in particular if this infringes on the defendants constitutional
right to effective cross-examination, can be resolved by a “balancing test.”88 The opinion
further states that:
the protection of undercover police operatives should be recognized as a basis for
the grant of public interest immunity,89 I should add that in my opinion the claim
to immunity should not be confined to undercover police operatives and that it
extends to other witnesses whose personal safety may be endangered by the
disclosure of the Court.90
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Id. at 43. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 15], Sample of cited cases: United States
v. Varelli, 407 F.2d 735 (1969) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 34] (address refusal
upheld; if government can show danger to the witness the burden can pass to the defendant to show
materiality of the address)
United States v. Palermo, 410 F.2d 468 (1969) (trial judge refused to disclose the addresses of two
witnesses and present employment; held, relevant information not before him to enable to make informed
decision however; where threat of life to witness, right of defendant to have TRUE NAME, address and
place of employment is not absolute), [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 32]
United States v. Crovedi, 467 F.2d (1972) (refusal of name upheld), [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at TAB 28]
United States v. Ellis, F.2d 638 (1972) (refusal of name upheld) [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at TAB 30]
United States v. Cosby, 500 F.2d 405 (1974) (refusal of address upheld) [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at TAB 27]
McGrathe v. Vinzant, 528 F.2d 681 (1976) (refusal of address of rape victim upheld: argument by
defendant was rejected by the majority where defendant claimed no threat since he was in custody and had
no accomplices, court states he might have friends or be acquitted). [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at TAB 17]
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Jarvie v. Magistrates’ Court of Victoria at Brunswick at 49-50. [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at TAB 15]
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Id. at 14. There is a public interest in preserving the anonymity of informers, protection of undercover
police operatives as a matter of legitimate public concern. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
TAB 15]
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Id. at 50. Opinion written by Judge Brooking. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 15]
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Likewise in Doorson v. Netherlands, in the prosecution of an alleged drug dealer,
six drug addicts who testified and identified the defendant remained anonymous.91 The
defense requested to examine the anonymous witnesses and cited the ruling in Kostovski,
and they were refused the right.92 The lawyer for the defendant was given the opportunity
to put questions to the witnesses, and these questions were answered with the exception
of those designed to identify the witnesses.93 “The Court in Doorson considers, on
balance, that the Amsterdam Court of Appeal was entitled to consider that the interests of
the applicant were in this respect outweighed by the need to ensure the safety of the
witnesses.”94 Additionally, the court in its ruling permitting the maintaining of the
witness’s anonymity, reiterated that when “counterbalancing” procedures are utilized to
lessen the defenses’ handicaps when facing anonymous testimony, this testimony should
not be the sole or decisive basis for a conviction.95
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Doorson v. Netherlands (App. No. 20524/92), Eur. Ct. H.R. (1996) 22 EHRR 330, [1996] ECHR
20524/92, (para. 8-10) 26 March 1996. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 14]
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Id. at (para. 23). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 14]
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Id. at (para. 25). In para. 46 of Doorson, In its judgment of July 1990, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie
(Netherlands Law Reports “NJ”) 1990, no. 692, The Supreme Court considered that in light of the
European Court’s ruling in Kostovski, that the use of anonymous statements were subject to stricter
requirements as those presented in previous case law. The Rule was defined as: Such a statement must
have been taken down by a judge who (a) is aware of the identity of the witness, and (b) has expressed, in
the official record of such a witness, has reasoned opinion as to the reliability of the witness and as to the
reasons for the wish of the witness to remain anonymous, and (c) has provided the defense with some
opportunity to put questions or have questions put to the witness. This rule is subject to exceptions; thus
according to the same judgment the statement of an anonymous witness may be used in evidence if (a) the
defense have not at any stage of the proceedings asked to be allowed to question to witness concerned and
(b) the conviction is based to a significant extent on other evidence not derived from anonymous sources,
and (c) the trial court makes clear that it has made use of the statement of the anonymous witness with
caution and circumspection. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 14]
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Id. at (para 76). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 14]
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C. The Trial Chamber must be satisfied that there exists no prima facie
evidence that the witness is untrustworthy. The prosecutor is required to
examine the background of the witness and be assured of no criminality and
that the witness is impartial.96
The Trial Chamber in Tadic, by majority, established guidelines in evaluating a
witnesses to ensure a fair trial when granting anonymity.97 The guidelines decided upon
by the Trial Chamber are as follows:
(1) The Judges must have access to the witnesses in order to determine their
demeanor, and to assess the reliability of their testimony;
(2) The Judges must know the identity of the witnesses so that they may be able
to test the witnesses reliability;
(3) The defense must be permitted ample opportunity to question the witnesses on
all issues unrelated to the witnesses identity, location, or traceability, such that
incriminating information can be examined while witness retains anonymity;
(4) The Trial chamber will not release identifying information about the
witness[es] without the witnesses express consent;
(5) The identities of the witnesses must be released when security and fear are no
longer factors98

The majority decision of the Trial Chamber in Tadic also turned to Kostovski,
and the ruling of the ECHR. 99 The Chamber interpreted the pertinent aspects of
Kostovski as the ability for a court to initiate procedural safeguards that can be adopted
when the witness’s identity is not to be disclosed which when “balanced” will ensure a
fair trial. 100 Judge McDonald, while adopting these guidelines from that same ruling of
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Tadic Decision ( para. 64.) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 22]
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Id. at (para 70)]. These guidelines were drawn from Kostovski, which Judge McDonald claims “is not on
point.” [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 22]
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Id. at (para. 71). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 22]
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Id. at (para. 68). Which the Trial Chamber stated was not directly on point since it does not relate to
testimony of anonymous witnessed who will be appearing before the Chamber, and whose evidence will be
subject to cross examination, and the witnesses demeanor will be observed by the judges present.
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 22]
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the European Court of Human Rights, stated “that these standards must be interpreted
within the context of the unique object and purpose of the International Tribunal,
particularly recognizing its mandate to protect victims and witnesses.101

D. The Trial Chamber’s inability to provide adequate protection for
witnesses has considerable weight when evaluating whether to grant
anonymity.102
The Victim’s and Witnesses Unit is organized in the Registry of the Tribunal
under Rule 34.103 The Unit has been designated to provide counseling and recommend
protective procedures for victims and witnesses. 104 The Victims and Witnesses Unit only
has the resources to offer limited protection.105 However, many of the witnesses’
families may be living within the territories where war crimes are still taking place.
Many of the witnesses of the Rwandan genocide continue to live in Zaire or Rwanda.
The United Nations Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda (HRFOR) reported the
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Id. at (para. 69). The court in Kostovski determined that when the defense must labor under the
handicaps of anonymous witnesses, procedures of the court can act as a counterbalance to redress any
diminution of rights. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 22]
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Natasha A. Affolder, Tadic, The Anonymous Witness and the Sources of International Procedural Law.
19 Mich. J. Int’l L. 445, 460 (1998). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 37]
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Tadic Decision at (para. 65). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 22]
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Christine Chinkin, Comment, Due Process and Witness Anonymity, 91 A.J.I.L. 75, 77 (1997).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 39]
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Alex C. Lakotos, Note: Evaluating the Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the International Tribunal
in the Former Yugoslavia: Balancing Witnesses’ Needs Against Defendant’s Rights. 46 Hastings L.J. 909
(1995). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 42]
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Christine Chinkin, Comment, Due Process and Witness Anonymity, 91 A.J.I.L. 75, 77 (1997).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 39]
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murder of 227 genocide survivors by the former Rwandese Armed forces and
interahamwe militia, to forestall any testimony by these survivors.106
While The Tribunal acknowledges the realities of retribution where loved ones
may be persecuted in retaliation or as an example to others because of the testimony of
an identified witness.107 The International Tribunal does not have the resources, or funds,
for a long-term witness protection program, and also such a program would be of little
benefit to families of witnesses who are missing or in danger.108
Commentators have stated that in answer to anonymous testimony, the court
should accommodate witness safety by creating an adequate witness protection
program.109 One suggestion was to remove witnesses, victims, and their families to other
countries under a relocation process.110 Additionally, the Tribunal could appeal to the
United Nations member nations to grant political asylum and new identities to the victims
and their families, as these individuals could qualify for refugee status and could be
reviewed under the category of persecuted ethnic minorities.111 This approach would
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1 VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA,
535 (1998). In addition, members of the HRFOR had also bee killed, motivated by fear “of being
denounced for acts committed during the genocide.” Also see n. 1784 at 535. [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at TAB 51]
107

Tadic Decision. (para. 65). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 22]
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Id. at 65. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 22]
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Vincent M. Creta, The Search for Justice in the Former Yugoslavia and Beyond: Analyzing the Rights
of the Accused Under The Rules of Procedure and Evidence of The International Criminal Tribunal For the
Former Yugoslavia. 20 Hous. J. Int’l 381 (1998). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 40]
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Id. at 401. The suggestion goes on to state that this should be modeled after the United States relocation
program. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 40]
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Mercedeh Momeni, Balancing the Procedural Rights of the Accused Against a Mandate to Protect
Victims and Witnesses: An Examination of the Anonymity Rules of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia. 41 How. L.J. 155, 176 (1997). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
TAB 45]
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permit the witness to testify against the defendant and be free from retaliation. 112
However, many witnesses and their families may not wish to leave their homes and be
faced with uncertain futures in strange countries.113 Additionally, the down side of
granting asylum, is that false claims may be leveled against an accused, in hopes of
escaping a war ravaged territory, which would undermine the credibility of legitimate
victims.114 Perhaps a limited asylum program may act to encourage witnesses to come
forward.115
In regard to the counseling given to witnesses another suggestion is that the Unit
should take additional steps to assure the testimony given by the witness is voluntary and
given with informed consent. 116 In addition, the Unit should provide legal, as well as,
psychological counseling, for while the psychological aspect is obvious as witnesses
struggle with the trauma of the event, legal counseling should be considered to prepare a
witness for the rigors of taking the stand, the prosecution’s preparation and to guide the
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Id. at 176. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 45]
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William M. Walker, Making Rapists Pay: Lessons from the Bosnian Civil War. 12 St. John’s J.L.
Comm. 449, 474 (1997). The author is referring to rape crimes. [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at TAB 48]
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Id. at 474. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 48]
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Id. at 474-475. where by coming forward the result may be 1) to begin getting convictions for the crime
of rape; and 2) to aid in the prosecution of prominent suspects. [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at TAB 48]
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Alex C. Lakotos, Note: Evaluating the Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the International Tribunal
in the Former Yugoslavia: Balancing Witnesses’ Needs Against Defendant’s Rights. 46 Hastings L.J. 909,
939 (1995). The author goes on to suggest that the rules should also permit the witness to stop testifying at
any time if the testimony becomes too painful. He also states that an announcement by the witness of the
voluntary nature of the testimony may deter future appeals on claims of coerced testimony. [Reproduced in
the accompanying notebook at TAB 42]
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witness through potentially abusive or harassing questions to which they may be
exposed.117
The inability for the Tribunal to provide an adequate witness protection program
is a substantial factor in the issue to permit anonymous testimony. For without any
protection beyond The Hague or Arusha, witnesses cannot conceivably sacrifice
themselves yet again to provide testimony, when retribution may be only a village away
when they return home. If the Tribunal had the resources to initiate a realistic witness
protection unit or program then it would be reasonable to disallow anonymous testimony
as the fear of reprisals could be removed. As stated above this too has its risks as
individuals seeking escape from the confines of their country may use the system to their
advantage, but this is not the current state of affairs. Additionally, an international
witness protection program must be realistic in not, for example, displacing the elderly
and placing them in another country with no means of support let alone no means to
communicate. This program would need to be quite extensive, and would require U.N.
members to agree to uphold the program, financially as well as logistically.

E. If at all possible, the Tribunal must determine if less restrictive measures
can be utilized to secure the necessary protection on behalf of the witness.
For this to be satisfied the accused must suffer no additional avoidable
prejudice in light of granting anonymity.118
Other levels of anonymity include partial, where the defendant can interview the
witness but is unaware of the witnesses identity, or In Camera Proceedings, or hearing by
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Id. at 939 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 42]
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Tadic Decision at (para. 66). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 22]
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the Court in absence of the defendant. 119 Other common law systems have allowed the
defense counsel to interview the witness without the defendant present.120 Additionally,
partial anonymity may allow the use of the witness’s name or pseudonym, but
withholding all information in regard to where the witness resides or their place of
employment. In regard to crimes in rural areas this is not realistic where everyone knows
everyone and identities can be easily deduced. Other processes exist to disguise a
witness, by voice or through video, but the question of anonymity remains.

IV.

Procedure/ Case Law and Practice

A. England and Wales
The justice system in England and Wales takes the adversarial approach in the
presentation of oral evidence in court, with the trier of fact determining guilt or
innocence, and in serious cases, a jury.121 Witnesses are expected to appear in open
court, under oath, to give oral evidence in the presence of the accused. Under the
Criminal Justice Act of 1988 (sections 23-26), a witness’ written statement may be
admissible in place of oral testimony if: (1) the witness is dead; (2) unfit to attend trial;
119

Annemarieke Beijer, Cathy Cobley, and André Klip, Witness Evidence, Article 6 of the European
Convention on Human Rights and the Principal of Open Justice 283, 292 in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN EUROPE:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY (Phil Fennell, Christopher Harding, Nico JÖrg, Bert Swart eds., 1995).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 49]
120

Mercedeh Momeni, Note, Balancing the Procedural Rights of the Accused Against a Mandate to Protect
Victims and Witnesses: An Examination of the Anonymity Rules of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia. 41 How. L.J. 155, 176 (1997). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
TAB 45]
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Annemarieke Beijer, Cathy Cobley, and André Klip, Witness Evidence, Article 6 of the European
Convention on Human Rights and the Principal of Open Justice 283, 285 in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN EUROPE:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY (Phil Fennell, Christopher Harding, Nico JÖrg, Bert Swart eds., 1995).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 49]
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(3) he is outside the UK; and (4) he made the statement to the police or investigating
officer.122 However these statements will only be admitted if the court agrees to admit
them as evidence in the interests of justice and at the discretion of the trial judge, but the
court realizes this limits the right of the defendant to examine the witness.123
In regard to the protection of witnesses the Courts of England and Wales will
usually compel a witness to testify, but the court will look to of the possibility of witness
intimidation, and examine other options such as an in camera hearing. 124 The English
Court in R. v. Brindle, an unreported case, permitted total anonymity under what they
viewed as extraordinary circumstances, where justifiable fear existed, and the defense
had no knowledge of the witness’s identity.125 In this case, the defendants were
acquitted, and the media was restricted in what they were permitted to publish, which
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Id. at 286. Also see, The Law Commission For England and Wales, Part II Present Law,
www.lawcom.gov.uk.library/lc245/pt2/htm Section 23 2.14 which discusses that a statement made by a
person in a document shall be prima facie admissible in criminal proceedings, as evidence of any fact
stated, of which oral testimony by him or her would have been admissible…and 2.21 of The Criminal
procedure and Investigations Act of 1996, where the prosecutor will examine a reluctant witness, the
witness evidence will be put in writing, … the prosecutor must serve it on the defense like other evidence.
Then the deposition can be used at committal proceedings, and at trial under previously stated provisions,
and the statement, on which no-cross examination has taken place will be prima facie admissible at trial
even thought the declarant will not be there to testify. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB
49] and [TAB 5]
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Annemarieke Beijer at 286. This in combination with the emphasis of the English courts on oral
evidence, restricts the use of such provisions. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 49]
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Id. at 290. The author cites to Attorney General v. Leveller Magazine [1979] AC 440. Where the
identity of a witness for the prosecution was kept from the public in the interests of national security.
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 49]
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Id. at 291. Where the Court cited R. v. Brindle, (unreported Central Criminal Court, 28 April 1992).
Where the witness refused to testify without a grant of anonymity. The Court adopted measures to permit
the public and the defense to hear the testimony of the witness but the identity was preserved through the
use of screens. The prosecution argued that they would submit the written statements of the witness if
anonymity was not permitted, under the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act of 1988 (sections 23-6).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 49]
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caused an outcry as many felt this was setting a dangerous precedent for future criminal
proceedings.126
B. European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)
The ECHR, under Article 6 of the Convention, acknowledges the right of the
accused to hear all evidence in his presence, but there exists room for exceptions.127
These exceptions include the witness’s fear of reprisals and that under these exceptional
circumstances the trial court may, in its discretion, hear witnesses in the absence of the
defendant. The ECHR considers it its responsibility to evaluate the proceedings as a
whole and to ensure that they where conducted in a “fair” manner, including the use of
procedural safeguards such as taking and introducing evidence.128 The ECHR has looked
at the case law of Unterpertinger, Kostovski, Windisch , Asch, and have determined that
when it is impossible to question a witness, and when authorities had made all attempts to
secure the witnesses’ presence, earlier statements may be used, for Article 6 of the ECHR
does not guarantee an unlimited right of the accused to a direct examination of a witness,
and as such, hearsay evidence may be accepted under special circumstances.129
In Unterpertinger, the defendant was charged by the Austrian Regional Court
with assaulting his wife and step-daughter based on statements taken from the victims, as
these witnesses refused to testify in court.130 On appeal before the ECHR the Court
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Id. at 291. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 49]
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Unterpertinger v. Austria (App. no. 9120/80), Eur. Ct. H.R. (1991) 13 EHRR 175, 1986 ECHR 9120/80.
24 November 1986. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 35]
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determined that the Austrian Court did not use the statements only as information, but as
“proof of the truth of the accusations made by the women at the time.”131 The ECHR
found that Mr. Unterpertinger did not receive a fair trial and that Article 6(1) of the
Convention was breached along with the principals in Article 3(d).132
In Asch v. Austria, a similar case involving domestic violence, statements given to
the police by the live-in partner of the defendant were admitted before the Austrian
Regional Court that resulted in the defendant’s conviction.133 The Witness/victim refused
to testify. However, on appeal before the ECHR on grounds of Article 6 violations, the
Court found that the Regional Court had used other evidence in conjunction with the
victim’s statement to reach its decision, inclusive of medical certificates corroborating
injuries and in-court police testimony recounting the victim’s descriptive statements,
therefore no Article 6 violation was found.134
Another Austrian case brought before the ECHR, Windisch v. Austria, where the
defendant was accused of a café burglary based on the testimony of two anonymous
witnesses who were never identified to the accused, nor to the court.135 Police officers
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Id. at (para. 33). It was for the Appeals Court to determine from the material presented, and the relevant
evidence, if Mr. Unterpertinger had been convicted solely on testimony while his rights (to examine
witnesses) were restricted. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 35]
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[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 35]
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Asch v. Austria (App, no. 12398/86) Eur. Ct H.R. (1993) 15 EHRR 597, 1991 ECHR 12398/86. 26 April
1991. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 12]
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Id. at (para. 28). Where the defendant did not examine the police officer, or call other witnesses. The
defendant claimed that the victim caused her own injuries. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
TAB 12]
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Windisch v. Austria (App. no. 12489/86), Eur. Ct. H.R. (1991) 13 EHRR 281, 1990 ECHR 12489/86.
27 September 1990. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 36]
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testified to the reliability of the witnesses and to what the witnesses had seen. 136 The
ECHR held that since no one had witnessed the actual commission of the crime, and that
the only evidence was the identification made by the two anonymous witnesses to the
defendants’ presence at the scene, which was the central issue in the investigation and
resulted in his conviction, created such limitations on the Mr. Windisch as to be deemed
an unfair trial.137
The Trial Chamber in Tadic relied heavily on the rulings of the ECHR in
Kostovski v. The Netherlands. 138 The ECHR discussed procedural safeguards under
Netherlands’ law that was the basis for the balancing test the Trial Chamber of the ICTY
incorporated. The Netherlands Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) allows judges greater
discretion where the magistrate acts to collect the evidence to convict or exculpate the
suspect.139 In actual practice, based on case precedence in the Netherlands, hearsay
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Id. at (para. 14). The pertinent Domestic law in regard to the taking of evidence at trial is governed by
Articles 246 and 245 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozessordnung) where:
“Article 247 (1) provides that ‘witnesses and experts shall be called separately and heard in the presence of
the accused.’ The presiding judge and the other members of the court, the public prosecutor, the accused,
the party seeking damages and their representatives may question them (Article 249). However, in certain
exceptional circumstances, their previous statements may be read out at the hearing (Article 252). No
provision deals expressly with statements made by anonymous witnesses and hearsay evidence.”
The trial court assesses the evidence based on Article 258 which reads:
“(1) in passing judgment the court shall only have regard to what has occurred at the trial…
(2) The court has to examine the evidence carefully and conscientiously with regard to its trustworthiness
and conclusiveness separately and in its entirety. The judges do not decide upon the question whether or
not a particular fact has been proven according to formal rules of evidence, but only according to their own
conclusions drawn on the basis of their careful examination of all evidence before them.” (para. 17-18 in
Windisch). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 36]
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Id. at (para. 31). The ECHR held violations of para. 3(d) along with para. 1 of Article 6 of the
Convention, and according to Article 50, and required Austria to pay costs and expenses. [Reproduced in
the accompanying notebook at TAB 36]
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Kostovski v. The Netherlands (App. No. 11454/85), Eur. Ct. H.R. (1990) 12 EHRR 434, ECHR
11454/85. 20 November 1989. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 16]
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Id. at (para. 24). “Under Article 338 CCP, a finding that the accused has been proved to have
committed the acts with which he is charged may be made by a judge only if he has been so convicted
through investigation at the trial by the contents of ‘legal means of evidence.’ The latter consist, according
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evidence can be introduced as evidence but with caution, and declarations made by the
accused or witnesses to police officers in official reports are permissible evidence.140
Where “in the great majority of cases witnesses are not heard at trial but either only by
police or also by the examining magistrate.”141 The ECHR, while looking to the
Netherlands law and practice, and the needs for witness protection as balanced against the
interests of society, the witnesses and the accused, concluded that the evidence on these
anonymous statements alone was insufficient to convict.142 The limitations placed on the
defendant were irreconcilable with the guarantees found in Article 6, and Mr. Kostovski
was found to have been denied a fair trial.143

to Article 339 CCP, exclusively of (i) what the judge himself has observed; (ii) statements made by the
accused; (iii) statements made by a witness; (iv) statements made by an expert; and (v) written documents.
(1) A statement by a witness is understood to be his statement, made in the investigation at the trial, of
facts or circumstances which he himself has seen or experienced.
(2) The trial judge cannot accept as proven that the defendant has committed the act with which he is
charged, solely on the statement of one witness.”
Additionally, under Article 288 CCP the Court can block a question from being put to the witness by the
accused, defense council or the public prosecutor.
Under Article 292 CCP, the Court can order an accused to leave the Court room an examine the witness out
of the accuseds’ presence, and no reasons need be given for such an order by the Court, however the
defense council may question the witness during this absence.
Under Article 295 CCP, “An earlier statement by a witness who, having been sworn in or admonished to
speak the truth in accordance with Article 216 para 2, has died or, in the opinion of the court, is unable to
appear at the trial should be considered as having been made at the trial, on condition that it is read aloud
there.”
And anonymous statements fall under Article 334 CCP and Article 339 CCP, “(1)where written
documents… (2) official reports…drawn up in legal form by bodies and persons who have proper authority
and containing their statement of facts or circumstances which they themselves have seen or
experienced…2. the judge can accept as proven that the defendant has committed the act with which he is
charged, on the official report of the investigating officer.” [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
TAB 16 ]
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however, the large majority of examining magistrates invite defense council and the accused to attend when
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The ECHR has held that a fair trial can be had without the right to examine the
witness as in Asch, where statements were provided without witness testimony. And
while the ECHR has considered that under extreme circumstances and with substantial
corroborative evidence anonymous testimony may be evaluated, it will not allow for a
conviction solely on the testimony of an anonymous witness where the defense has no
ability to examine the witnesses, and strips the defendant of fundamental rights to a fair
trial.

C. Netherlands
In 1983, the Dutch Association of Judges was concerned with the increased
incidents of witness harassment and threats of violence which subsequently led to
witnesses refusing to testify unless they were granted anonymity. 144 The prevalence of
organized criminality in the region led to the introduction of “the Commission on
Threatened Witnesses” which considered proposals for future legislation allowing for the
anonymity of witnesses.145 The legislation was to forbid evidence of statements made by
anonymous witnesses unless under extreme circumstances where exceptions would be
made if the risks to the witness were unacceptable.146 This proposed legislation was put
on hold awaiting the outcome of the Kostovski case and since the ECHR found The
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Kostovski v. The Netherlands at (para. 34). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB 16]
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the accompanying notebook at TAB 16]
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Netherlands to have violated Mr. Kostovski’s Article 6 rights, this legislation may have
been shelved.147
Generally, The Dutch criminal process allows all material evidence into court and
has no rule against the presentation of hearsay evidence.148 The judges must use caution
when evaluating such statements, and most of the Dutch process involves the results of
the pre-trial investigation.149 The witness’s statements can be used at trial whether or not
the defendant is present, and the court while allowing the defendant to call a witness, may
refuse to permit the witness to testify if it believes that no harm will come to the
defense.150 The Court permits in camera hearings,151 hearing by the Court without the
presence of the defendant,152and witness anonymity. 153The Dutch Court’s interpretation
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of the Kostovski ruling was that judicial procedures can counterbalance the inequalities to
the defense when it is impossible to allow for a witness to be questioned. 154
D. New Zealand
The landmark cases tried before the New Zealand Court of Appeals pertaining to
witness anonymity are: R. v. Hughes and R. v. Hines. The Court in R. v. Hughes faced
the issue of disclosure of an undercover police officers’ true name in giving evidence
during a drug offense trial.155 The Justices within Hughes argued strongly on both sides
of the issue, with the majority taking the deliberate position that the accused and defense
council have the absolute right to know the identity of a witness for the prosecution.156
The Dissent in Hughes argued that an undercover officer should not reveal his identity
unless compelled by a presiding judge who views the disclosure to be of such relevance
to the facts that withholding the information would be contrary to the interests of
justice.157
In R. v. Hines, a witness came forward after viewed a stabbing from a portable
toilet, and only gave a statement after being assured of his anonymity.158 The accused
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was the president of a local gang, and other witnesses came forward to testify against the
accused.159 The Appeals Court in Hines was faced with whether the Judge was at liberty
to depart from the previous ruling in Hughes, and thereby change the common law of
New Zealand, or let the case precedent stand,160 while the Dissent presented three
relevant statutory developments,161 seeking change the Court majority ruled that it should
continue to follow Hughes and that any future changes in the law should be decided by
Parliament.162 Both of these landmark cases cited United States cases within their
opinions. In particular, the dissent in Hughes pointed out that since the United States is
subject to the Constitutional rights, and the Sixth Amendment rights of the accused, and
New Zealand offers no formal constitutional guarantees, the courts of New Zealand
should have a “freer hand,” but traditional respect for a fair trial does not reflect any real

evidence based on Witness A. The trial court aborted the Trial and a new trial was ordered. At the second
Trial the judge ruled against the Crown’s attempt to keep the identity of Witness A from the defense.
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distinction.163 In addition, the Hines decision determining the absolute rights of the
accused to know the identity of his accuser reflects little difference on this point between
New Zealand and the United States.

E. United States
The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides the right of a criminal
defendant “to be confronted with the witnesses against them.”164 Often in the United
States domestic trials, adult rape victims are protected, in that their identities are not
released to the media or public.165 Children's identities are also kept from the public in
cases of molestation or sexual abuse. 166Likewise situations where individual witnesses or
their families have been threatened, the testimonies of undercover agents, or trials
pertaining to trade secrets all have permitted anonymity from the public and media.167
However in the United States the accused has a Constitutionally protected right to face
his accusers.
The Supreme Court of California recently reversed the California Appeals Court
in Alvardo v. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County, when the Appeals Court granted
an order authorizing the prosecutor to refuse to disclose the identities of witnesses prior
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to, and during trial.168 The witness was thought to be in grave danger as he witnessed a
murder in the County jail, where the victim had been referred to as a “snitch,” and the
witness continued to be incarcerated at the same facility.169 The Appeals Court found
that the trial court has exercised its discretion in authorizing the prosecution to
permanently withhold the names of the witnesses’ identities from the defense “since it
would place them in mortal danger…” The Supreme Court of California, unlike in
earlier case precedent did not have to analyze the order of non-disclosure at pre-trial, but
during trial, which implicates the defendants’ right to confrontation under the federal
Constitution.170
The Court citing Smith v. Illinois, 171 where the United States Supreme Court has ruled
that:
Yet when the credibility of a witness is in issue, the very starting point in
‘exposing falsehood and bringing out the truth’ through cross-examination must
necessarily be to ask the witness who he is and where he lives…to forbid this
most rudimentary inquiry at the threshold is effectively to emasculate the right of
cross-examination itself.”
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Many federal Court decisions have held that if the true identity of a witness is
deemed to be inconsequential to material issues before the court, then non-disclosure is
permissible as long as it does not prejudice the defense.172 However all decisions where
the identity of the witness was crucial, or the prosecution failed to state cause for nondisclosure, the courts uniformly have concluded that at the time of trial disclosure is
required.173 Therefore, the California Supreme Court in Alvardo ruled that discretion at
the pre-trial phase is reasonable under § 1054.7 of the California Penal Code, while the
“witnesses safety must yield to petitioner’s right to confrontation under the U.S. Const.
amend. VI. Prosecution witnesses [are] not permitted to testify anonymously at trial.174
The legislature has also aided in protecting witnesses through the extensive
witness protection program existing in the United States, in particular, to shield witnesses
against reprisals. United States Code, Title 18 chapter 224- Protection of witnesses,
permits the Attorney General of the United States to authorize and provide for relocation
and protection of witnesses that are involved in an official proceeding on behalf of the
Federal or state government, concerning an organized criminal activity or otherwise
serious offense.175 The Witness Protection program within the United States allows
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sufficient protection for a testifying witness who would be placed in danger because of
their participation in the judicial proceedings. 176
All of the above countries to some degree allow partial anonymity from the press
or the media, particularly in cases involving sexual assault, narcotics or organized crime.
Children are most frequently protected from media exposure. In the United States, where
the strictest standards exist in relation to the defendant’s rights under the U.S.
Constitution the U.S. Legislature realized that when it depended on witnesses to testify,
particularly in high profile criminal cases, it was paramount to protect those testifying
through the enactment of a Federal Witness Protection Program. However these
programs are cost prohibitive to many nations.

V.

Conclusion

In examining the alternatives the current and future International Tribunals are
faced with they seem daunting and cyclical. If a Tribunal is unable to protect witnesses
from retribution because they testify against a war criminal, then the Tribunal will have
fewer and fewer witnesses to bring justice forward, and to hold these violators of
international human rights law accountable. On the other hand if the Tribunal grants
anonymity to testifying witnesses, then the integrity of the court may suffer irreparable
harm as the rights of the accused: 1) to a “fair trial” and; 2) to examine and crossexamine witnesses, is sacrificed to protect the witness.
Many nations have allowed partial anonymity, or pre-trial anonymity under
extreme circumstances, particularly: 1)child witnesses; 2)undercover police agents and;
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3) in drug or organized crime cases. Anonymity is often granted from the public and
media in rape cases. Additionally several nations that disallow anonymity provide in its
stead a functioning witness protection program for the witnesses, including relocation
with a new identity.
Before the court resorts to balancing the rights of witnesses against an
accused, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence should unequivocally state the Tribunal’s
position, either for or against witness autonomy. If the Rules prohibit witness autonomy
then a functioning witness protection program must be in place so that the identified
witnesses, will have sanctuary after aiding the Tribunal with their testimony.
If the rules grant anonymity, then to protect the integrity of the Court, and avoid
perceptions of arrogance on the part of the ruling justices to interpret the current Rules
with “unfettered discretion,” the international community must come to a determinative
decision to amend the current Rules before it reaches any Trial Chamber. Likewise this
would put the defendant on notice that anonymous testimony will be permitted. However,
courts across many jurisdictions have found alternatives to total anonymity, and if
granted it should not be the sole basis for conviction but only used to corroborate other
evidence at trial.
The International Criminal Tribunals should be the champions of human rights
and therefore due process. Beyond the importance of the Tribunals’ credibility lies the
paramount importance of having an International Court system where all are treated
fairly, particularly the violators of human rights, so that when they are held accountable,
the verdict will not be tainted with allegations of false testimony or bias.
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